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ELWOOD 
vs. 
-./~ 
~._? 
r -~ ~ ~ rt·=__, D ; !--1 ir· r.-. .J - ii r, ~ .... "'":::> :~ . 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
~·········---·-··-···--···-··---···--......a 
K. McFARLAND, ) 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) APPELLANT SKAGGS ADDITIONAL 
AUTHORITIES AND CORRECTIONS 
) 
SKAGGS, INC., 
) Case No. 18352 
Defendant/Appellant. 
) 
COMES NOW Appellant Skaggs pursuant to Rule 75(p)(3) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and submits its Additional Authorities 
and Corrections as follows: 
I 
1. It is the position of Skaggs, and always has been, that its 
privilege or justification to detain McFarland was two fold: 
(a) the shoplifting statutes which allow : a storeowner the 
right to detain a customer for a reasonable time and in a reason-
able manner when the storeowner has reason to believe (probable 
cause) that the customer has unlawfully taken merchandise from 
the store without paying for it.· (This was the basis on which 
McFarland was initially approached). 
. I 
(b) the criminal statute (77-13-4) which allows any private 
person the right to detain (arrest) another person "for a public 
offense committed or attempted in his presence" when the private 
person has reason to believe (probable cause) that the other 
person has committed a public offense, which includes an assault, 
in his presence, i.e. specifically, in this case, on her person. 
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(This was an additional basis on which McFarland was detained). 
2. As soon as possible after McFarland was detained, Skaggs 
called the police in order "to inform a peace officer of the detention 
of the person and surrender th~t person to the custody of a peace 
officer." (76-6-603(5) When the peace officer arrived, he investiga-
ted both (a) the shoplifting charge and (b) the assault charge. 
Thereafter, he advised Skaggs' security officer Avondet as follows: 
Lucas; "Are you really hurt?" 
Avondet~ "Oh, not that bad. Just you know. 
I've been hit and I'm not bleeding or 
cut or anything." 
Lucas; "Well it's up to you. We have a good· 
assault case. It's'up to you~"· 
(Record p. 59, 100) 2 
Because Avondet was not hurt, she decided not to have McFarland 
formally arrested for assault (and thus~taken before a magistrate) 
and because the merchandise she had seen McFarland put in his pocket 
could not be found, she decided not to have McFarland formally 
arrested for shoplifting either, and thus it was decided that McFarland 
should simply be released. 
3. The period of time that McFarland was detained was for both 
the shoplifting charge and the assault charge. They overlapped each 
other. Thus, if Skaggs was justified or privileged by law to detain 
McFarland on either the shoplifting charge or the assault charge, 
the dete_ntion was not unlawful. · ... To say it another way, if Skaggs was 
Q, 
not justified or privileged to det~in McFarland on the shoplifting 
charge, but Skaggs was justi~ied or privileged_ to detain McFarland 
op the assault charge, then the detention was ~till lawful because the 
detention period for the assault charge overlapped and was the same 
as the detention period for the sh?p~ifting charge. 
-?-
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4. Skaggs was not given a fair trial and the trial court 
committed reversable and prejudicial error by instructing the jury 
(Court's Instruction No. 12 and McFarland's Supplemental Request No. 
2) that in order for Skaggs' detention of McFarland on the assault 
charge to be justified or privileged, Skaggs had to prove bexond a 
reasonable doubt that McFarland would have been found guilty of the 
crime of assault in a criminal court. In addition, the Court 
conrrnitted reversable and prejudicial error by instruc,ting the jury 
(Court's Instruction No. 11 and McFarland's Supplemental·Request No. 
1) that in Utah "there is no statutory privilege protecting against 
an unlawful arrest for assault based on one having probable cause to 
believe an assault had been committed." 
5. SkB;ggs objected to the Court's Instructions Nos 12 and 11; 
among others, and requested Instructions that properly set forth the 
j 
burden of proof in this case, that being, proof by a preponderance 
of the evidence and not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Skaggs' 
Requested Instruction No. 1, attached hereto, stated that the burden 
of proof was a preponderance of the evidence. The Court did not 
give this instruction as requested. Skaggs' Requested Instruction 
No. 2, attached hereto, defined the term "preponderance of the 
evidence" and uprobable cause" and "reasonable belief". The Court 
did not give these Instructions as requested, but did in substance 
(Court's Instructions Nos. 2 and 8). Skaggs' Requested Instruction 
Nos. 5, 6, 7, 10 and 11, attached hereto, stated the law concerning 
shoplifting. The Court chose only to give Skaggs Requested Instruction 
No. 11 (Court's Instruction No. 7). Skaggs' Requested Instruction 
Nos. 12 and 13 stated the law concerning assault. The Court gave 
-3-
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Skaggs' Instruction No. 12 (Court's Instruction No. 9) but added the 
objectional second paragraph to its Instruction No. 11, to which 
Skaggs objected, that "if an assault had not been committed, then she 
had no right to arrest pla'intiff" and that ,-,there is no statutory 
privilege protecting against an unlawful arrest for assault based ' 
on one having probable cause to believe an assaulr had been committed." 
The Court then instructed the jury in its Instruction No. 12 (Mc-
Farland's Supp~emental Request No. 2), over Skaggs' objectio~ that 
Skaggs had to prove the crime of assault by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt or the arrest or detention for assault was unlawful. Thus, 
Skaggs did request the proper instructior13concerning preponderance 
of the evidence, and what constitutes a lawful detention for shop-
lifting and assault, both of which are based on probable cause or 
reasonable belief. 
6. The following corrections should be made to Appellant 
Skaggs Brief on Appeal: 
(a) p. 7, cite is 78-11-7, not 78-17-7; 
(b) p. 13, cite in Lazarus v. Pascuzzi should be 393 
N.E. 2d 1079 (Ill. 1979), not 333; 
(c) p. 14, cite should be 393 NE2d 1079, 1080, not 333 
P.2d P.2d 1080; 
(d) p. 19, cite should be 4 U.L.R. 476, 477 not 486, 487; 
(e) p. 22, cite should be 404 A.2d 147, 153 footnote 16 
(District of Columbia 1979), not excluding footnote. 
Appellant Skaggs respectfully submits that this Court should 
grant a new trial to Skaggs because the trial court committed reversable 
and prejudicial error by imposing upon Skaggs in a civil trial the 
obligation of proving its defense of justification or privilege to 
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detain plaintiff by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt (i.e. a 
criminal standard in a civil trial), instead of by a preponderance 
of the evidence, and by advising the jury that Skaggs had no privilege 
to detain plaintiff based on probable cause or a reasonable belief 
I 
~ 
that an assault had been committed, and thus the trial court made it 
impossible for Skaggs to receive a fair trial. In addition, it is 
respectfully submitted that an award of punitive damages should be 
based on. the facts and circumstances of each case, malice in fact, 
and not implied by law, malice in law, as where there is an unlawful 
detention or arrest-based on a good faith, honest mistake. 
DATED this 14th day of November, 1983. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the 
foregoing Appellant Skaggs' Additional Authorities and Corrections, 
postage prepaid, to : 
Findley P. Gridley 
Bruce R. Baird 
Attorneys for Plaintiff /Respondent 
427 - 27th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
on ths 14th day of November, 1983~. ,, , , ' 
);U_ JJ_,,1J ' -1 ln~. o,_,,j 
Step en G. Morgan 
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INSTRUCTION NO. I 
--
Whenever in these instructions it is st~ted that the burden, 
or the burden of proof, rests upon a certain party to prove a certain 
allegation made by him, the meaning of such an instruction is this: 
That unless the truth of that allegation is proved by a preponderance 
of the evidence, you shall find that the same is not true. If the 
evidence is evenly balanced, as to its convincing force on any allega-
tion, you must find that such allegation has not been proved. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. c2 
The term "preponderance of the evidence" means the greater 
weight of the evidence, that is, such evidence as, when weighed with 
that opposed to it, is more convincing as to its truth. 
The existence of "probable cause," justifying an arrest without 
a warrant, is determined by factual and practical considerations 
of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal 
technicians, act. It is a pragmatic question to be determined in each 
case in the light of the particular circumstances and the particular 
offense involved. 
Probable cause does not depend on the actual state of the case in 
point of fact, as it may turn out upon legal investigation, but on 
I 
knowledge of facts and circumstances that would be sufficient to induce 
a reasonable belief in the truth of the accusation. It depends on the 
facts known, at the time of the arrest, to the person by whom the arrest 
is made, from which it follows that an arrest cannot be justified by 
what a subsequent search discloses. On the pther hand, if probable 
cause existed at the time of the arrest, the fact that investigation 
proves the person arrested to be innocent does not make the arrest 
unjustifiable. 
The term "reasonable belief" is used interchangeably with the 
term "probable cause". 
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t • 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that the law in the State of Utah is as 
follows: 
"78-11-17 .. Shoplifting-Authority to search.-Any mer~ 
chant may request any individual on his premises to place or 
keep in full view any merchandise such individual may have 
removed, or which the merchant has reason to believe he may 
have removed, from its place of display or elsewhere, 
whether for examination, purchase or for any other reason-
able purpose. No merchant shall be criminally or civilly 
liable on account of having made such a request." 
"78-11-18. Shoplifting-Authority to detain.- Any 
merchant who has reason to believe that merchandise has 
been wrongfully taken by an individual and that he can 
recover such merchandise by taking such individual into 
custody and detaining him may, for ~he purpose of attempting 
to effect such recovery or for the purpose of informing a 
peace officer of the circumstances of such detention, take 
the1individual into custody and detain him, on the premises, 
in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable length of time. 
Such taking into custody and detention by a merchant or his 
employee shall not render such merchant or his employee 
criminally or civilly liable for false arrest, false im-
prisonment, slander or unlawful detention or for any other 
type of claim or action unless such taking into custody 
and detention are unreasonable under all the circumstances." 
"78-11-14. Shoplifting-Definitions.-As used in this 
act: 
(3) 'Merchant' means an owner or operater of premises 
in which merchandise is displayed, held or offered for sale 
and includes his employees, servants and agents. 
(2) 'Merchandise' means any personal property displayed, 
held or offered for sale by a merchant. 
(5) "Wrongful taking of merchandise' means the taking 
of merchandise that has not been purchased from a merchant's 
premises without the permission of the merchant or one of 
his employees, servants or agents." 
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INSTRUCTION NO. (o 
You are instructed that Ainta Avondet had a right to request 
Plaintiff to place in full view any merchandise that he may have 
removed, or which Anita Avondet had reason to believe he may have 
removed, from its place of display or elsewhere, whether for 
examination, purchase or for any other reasonable purpose and you are 
further instructed that Defendant Skaggs cannot be found civilly 
liable to Plaintiff on account of Anita Avondet having made such 
request. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2-. 
You are instructed that if Anita Avondet had reason to believe 
that plaintiff had wrongfully taken merchandise then she had a right 
to recover such merchandise by taking plaintiff into custody and 
detai~ing him for the purpose of attempting to effeGt such recovery 
or for the purpose of informing a police officer of the circumstances 
of such detention as long as she did so in a reasonable manner and 
for a reasonable length of time and you are further instructed that 
defendant Skaggs cannot be found civilly liable to plaintiff for 
false arrest, false imprisonment, slander or unlawful detention on 
account of such taking into custody and detention unless such taking 
into custody and detention was unreasonabie under all the circumstances. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. /0 
You are instructed that·. the law in the State of Utah~ is as .. 
follows: 
"76-6-603. Detention of suspected violator by merchant-
Purposes .- Any merchant who has probable cause to believe 
that a person has cormnitted retail theft may detain such 
person, on or off the premises of a retal mercantile estab-
lishment, in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable length 
of time for all or any of the following purposes: 
(1) To make reasonable inquiry as to whether such person 
has in his possession unpurchased merchandise and to make 
reasonable investigation of the ownership of such merch~ndise; 
(2) To request identification; 
(3) To verify such identification; 
(4) To make a reasonable request of such person to place 
or keep in full view any merchandise such individual may have 
rem9ved, or which the merchant has reason to believe he may have 
removed, from its place of display or elsewhere, whether for 
examination, purchase or for any other reasonable purpose; 
(5) To inform a peace officer of the detention of the 
person and surrender that person to the custody of a peace 
officer·" , 
"76-6-604. Defense to action by person detained.-In 
any action for false arrest, false imprisonment, unlawful 
detention, defamation of character, assault, trespass, or 
invasion of civil rights brought by any person detained by 
the merchant, it shall be a defense to such action that 
the merchant detaining such person had probable cause to 
believe that the person had committed retail theft and 
that the merchant acted reasonably under all circumstances." 
"76-6-604(4). 'Merchant' means an owner or operator 
of any retail mercantile establishment where merchandise 
is displayed, held or offered for sale and includes the 
merchant's employees, servants or agents; 
(3) 'Merchandise' means any personal property displayed, 
held or offered for sale by a merchant;" 
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INSTRUCTION NO. jJ_ 
You are instructed that if Anita Avondet had probable cause 
. 
to believe that Plaintiff had taken possession of, concealed, or 
carried away merchandise displayed·· for sale with the intention-of 
retaining such merchandise without paying for it, then she had a right 
to detain Plaintiff on or off Skaggs premises in a reasonable manner 
and for a reasonable length of time (1) to make reasonable inquiry 
as to whether Plaintiff had in his possession unpurchased merchandise 
and to make reasonable investigation of the ownership of such mer-
chandise, (2) to request identification, (3) to verify identific~tion, 
(4) to make a reasonable request of Plaintiff to place in full view 
-
such merchandise, and (5) to inform a peace officer of the detention 
of Plaint~ff and surrender Plaintiff to the custody of a peace officer 
and you are further instructed that under such circumstances Defendant 
Skaggs cannot be found civilly liable to Plaintiff in an action for false 
arrest, false imprisonment, unlawful detention, defamation of character, 
assault, trespass, or invasion of civil righ~s as long as Anita Avondet 
acted reasonably under all circumstances. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. /~ 
You are instructed that the law in the State of Utah is as 
follows: 
"76-5-102. Assault.-(1) Assualt is: 
(a) An attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to 
do bodily injury to another; or 
-· (b) A threat, accompanied by a show of ilillilediate force 
or violence, to do bodily injury to another." 
"77-13-1. 'Arrest.' defined-By whom made.- An arrest 
is the taking of a person into custody in a case and in ·the 
manner authorized by law. An arrest may be made by a peace 
officer or by a private person." 
"77-13-2. How made-Restraint allowed.- An arrest .is 
made by an actual restraint of the person of the defendant ... " 
J 
"77-13-4. By private persons.- A private person may 
arrest another: 
(1) For a public offense conrrnitted or attempted in 
his presence." 
An "assault" constitutes a "public offense." 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INSTRUCTION NO. ) ~ r.--
You are instructed that if .Plaintiff connnitted an assault 
on Anita Avondet then she had a right to arrest Plaintiff and to 
detain him for purposes of surrendering him to the custody of a 
peace officer. 
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